http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=19400&Submit=Submit

Having failed to induce change in Burma by dangling the carrot of reduced sanctions, the US is now calling for a

Sept 2010 edition of The Irrawaddy

war crimes investigation of the country’s military rulers.

Diplomatic eyebrows were raised in March when UN Special Rapporteur Tomás Ojea Quintana issued a report recommending that the UN form an international Commission of Inquiry (CoI) to investigate alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Burma. But other than the UK, Australia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, no country rushed to support the proposal. The silence of the US was particularly deafening, but in August the Obama administration officially threw its support behind a CoI.

When the Quintana report was released in March, the US was enmeshed in an attempt to implement its new policy of “pragmatic engagement” with the Burmese military. Although sanctions remained in place under the new policy, the US held out the possibility they would be relaxed if the junta responded to calls to institute democratic and human rights reforms.

The regime, however, has arguably been even more obstinate since the engagement policy was introduced, and the announcement by the US that it supports the CoI may be the culmination of a recent series of setbacks for the Obama administration in which it was either rebuffed or ignored by Naypyidaw.

In March, the regime issued what has been almost universally described as unfair election laws and refused once again to release political prisoners, resulting in the US saying categorically that the election will not be free and fair. And in July, disclosures regarding Burma’s nascent nuclear program and military ties to North Korea in violation of UN Security Council resolutions resulted in direct US criticism and warnings.

US support for the CoI was welcomed by Burmese opposition leaders and exiles. Aung Din, the executive director of the US Campaign for Burma, called it “the right and timely action by the Obama administration” in response to the regime’s efforts to prolong its hold on power by holding a sham election.

But while the US support for a CoI may have provided momentum to the process, it remains to be seen whether and how the US will turn its backing of the investigation into action.

According to David Williams, a constitutional law expert at Indiana University in the US who has visited ethnic regions inside Burma: “The most effective route would be to get the UN Security Council (UNSC) to authorize a CoI, because ultimately Burma will not come before the International Criminal Court (ICC) without Security Council referral.”

The issue could be brought before the UNSC after the annual General Assembly vote on Burma later this year. However, China and probably Russia would oppose any such resolution.

China and Russia abstained in a UNSC vote on setting up a CoI for possible war crimes committed in Darfur by the Sudanese Army and its proxy militias. China followed a policy of “non-interference’” in Sudanese affairs, even as it supplied the regime with oil revenues and weapons enabling it to carry out violence against its own people in Darfur.

This does not mean, however, that hopes for a CoI on Burma are a lost cause. A CoI was eventually established for Sudan after months of high-level advocacy and a blizzard of media reporting on the fighting in Darfur.

According to Williams, a back-up plan would involve the UN secretary-general conducting the CoI on his own authority, “perhaps with a General Assembly resolution in support.” Another first step could be to introduce a resolution at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, where Thailand currently holds the rotating Presidency.

Even if the UNSC could be sidestepped in initiating a CoI, prosecuting Burmese junta leaders for war crimes in the ICC would be even more difficult. First, the CoI has to establish that war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed. Second, Williams told The Irrawaddy that the only viable way for a case against the Burmese regime to go before the ICC is through the UNSC.

“The UN Security Council can refer a case to the prosecutor,” he said. “When a case begins this way, the Court has jurisdiction even over crimes occurring in states that are not parties to the Rome Statute, such as Burma. This path therefore seems the most promising. Darfur came before the ICC by this route.”

The groundwork for establishing a case against the Burmese generals has already been laid. The Quintana report said that the “gross and systematic” nature of the abuses and the lack of action to stop them indicated “a state policy that involves authorities in the executive, military and judiciary at all levels.”

It said; “According to consistent reports, the possibility exists that some of these human rights violations may entail categories of crimes against humanity or war crimes under the terms of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.”

Benedict Rogers, the author of a recently released biography of Burma’s ruler, Snr-Gen Than Shwe, said he believes that there is sufficient evidence for a case to be made.

“Over many years, the United Nations itself has documented evidence of the widespread and systematic use of rape, forced labor, the forcible conscription of child soldiers and other violations that count as war crimes and crimes against humanity,” he told The Irrawaddy.

Ethnic-based NGOs such as the Karen Human Rights Group, the Shan Women’s Action Network and the Free Burma Rangers have all issued reports outlining such crimes, which Janhabi Nandy, the manager of policy and advocacy at the Nobel Women’s Initiative, described as constituting a breach of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) principles agreed to by the UN in 2005, whereby states are expected to protect their own civilians.

Once again, however, a solid case against Burmese leaders will not be enough to get it to the ICC. In January 2007, a UNSC resolution was proposed based on the R2P principle calling for an end to the grave violations of human rights in Burma. However, China and Russia vetoed the resolution, claiming that the internal affairs of a state did not belong in the UNSC and that the situation did not constitute a threat to international peace and security.

So given the fact that establishing a CoI will be difficult in its own right, and bringing a case before the ICC is a long shot at best, observers are asking what this chess move by the US is intended to accomplish.

Although firm sanctions have always remained in place and never been lessened, the US has been criticized since the institution of its pragmatic engagement policy for failing to make clear the consequences the junta would suffer if it didn’t respond to US overtures. The US call for a CoI may therefore be the stick that many have been waiting for the US to wield.

Former National Security Council official Mike Green told The Irrawaddy, “Frankly, the administration sometimes appeared too eager at the start, and probably should have had more sticks to go with the carrots so that the junta understood the engagement was not unconditional.”

The CoI move might also be an attempt to increase pressure on the regime’s senior military officers ahead of the upcoming elections and foment divisions within their ranks.

John Dale, an analyst of Burmese politics who teaches at George Mason University in Washington, DC, said the move signalled a concession by the US “that [its] diplomatic efforts to influence the junta to hold free, fair and credible elections will not be enough to steer Burma toward democracy.”

The ultimate impact of the US announcement, however, will be determined by its follow-through. The US said it is currently consulting with international partners, and if the US can garner enough support to actually begin a CoI, then some of the generals may think twice about repeating their more egregious abuses in the future.

However, there seems to be little pressure coming from Burma’s neighbors in Southeast Asia, and if regional and international allies shy away and the now joint call by the UN and US turns out to be hollow, it may actually strengthen the regime’s apparent self-perception of being able to act internally with impunity.

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=120399

When the US lined up as the fifth country to back a Commission of Inquiry into war crimes and crimes against humanity in Burma earlier this week, it did more than just back the surprise March recommendation – By Simon Roughneen for ISN Security Watch

The move marks an about-turn on Washington’s Burma policy, which had, for a few months at least, been predicated on the hope that the junta would defy precedent and respond to foreign inducements.

The first move came from Burma in February 2009, according to US officials. Afterwards, months were spent in Washington devising a new policy on Burma, which when announced, did not change that much in practice, as it retained sanctions. However, the US suggested that these measures could be relaxed, pending reforms in Burma.

To this end, Barack Obama became the first US president to meet with a representative of the Burmese government when he sat four seats away from the junta prime minister in Singapore in November 2009 at the inaugural US-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit.

However, the overtures were rebuffed or ignored, leaving the Americans looking somewhat naive as they were strung along by Burma’s military dictator, Senior-General Than Shwe. In what might have been a final straw for the US, the junta last week announced a 7 November date for the country’s first election in 20 years, but it has ignored appeals to release opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and more than 2,100 other political prisoners. The electoral laws were criticized for their restrictive nature, prompting Suu Kyi to boycott the polls.

The junta front party known as the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) benefits from state resources, and is thought likely to win easily – similar to the last elections in 1990 when the military party was deemed a shoe-in, only to be resoundingly beaten by Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, a result which the junta promptly ignored.

This time around it is thought that the military leaders will not take their eye off the ball. The 7 November date comes a week before Suu Kyi’s house arrest is up, meaning that she will be locked up at home when the election takes place.

Burmese exiles and opposition groups let it be known that they were skeptical about the US overtures to the junta, which other ASEAN member-states spun as vindication of their own long-standing but fruitless ‘engagement’ with the Burmese rulers, which garnered plenty of lucrative natural resource contracts but little in the way of democratic reform.

The reality is that the US was and is seeking to curb China’s growing influence around Southeast Asia, and that Burma is a minor part of this bigger issue.

Despite Burma being a source for hundreds of thousands of refugees and millions of migrant workers – many illegal – fleeing economic stagnation and repression at home, neighboring countries appear to be happy with the status quo. Allegations that the Burmese junta is working with North Korea on a nuclear weapons program and is in breach of UN Security Council resolutions against Pyongyang doubtless contributed to the US decision to back the inquiry.

However, despite the security implications for neighbors such as Thailand, there seems to be little apparent concern in or pressure coming from Southeast Asian capitals, aside from occasional exasperated-sounding remarks from the foreign ministries in Jakarta and Manila.

If the war crimes probe goes ahead, it will likely come after a UN General Assembly resolution later this year. The matter can then be referred to the UN Security Council, where as things stand, China and Russia would likely oppose the motion. But if the US is seriously backing the commission, then the first stop is possibly for a resolution to be introduced at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, where Thailand currently holds the rotating presidency, in September when that body next convenes.

The US is likely now to seek broader support for the commission, so far backed by Australia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the UK. The first port of call is likely to be Ottawa, followed by various EU capitals, to seek a common EU position on the commission of inquiry. The latter may prove difficult, as European countries differ on their position vis-a-vis the junta.

Less-tangibly, it is unclear how this latest US move fits in with recent assertiveness with junta ally China, with Washington forging new links with countries such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Indonesia to hedge against the surging economic power of Beijing. Earlier, at the start of his administration, President Obama pledged an open hand to ‘rogue’ states and erstwhile enemies. Whether or not the Burma about-turn presages similar moves elsewhere remains to be seen.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=19262

BANGKOK – After months of diplomatic horse-trading and pressure, Thailand’s appeal court today ruled that Viktor Bout is to be extradited to the U.S. to face terrorism charges. He faces life in prison if convicted, with charges including conspiracy to kill US officers or employees and conspiracy to acquire and use an anti-aircraft missile.

Bout maintains that allegations against him are politically-motivated and that he was running a legitimate air cargo business. Mr Bout was labelled a ‘Merchant of Death’ by British Government minister Peter Hain, back in 2000 after years of running his alleged arms trade business with warlords and governments in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.

United Nations agencies and several Western governments have reported numerous times that Bout sent arms to dictators and warlords in Africa and Afghanistan, breaking several UN arms embargoes in the process.

In a scene akin to something out of a John le Carré novel, Bout was snared in a 2008 sting operation mounted by U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operatives posing as Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) arms dealers, operating alongside the Thai authorities.

In 2009 a Thai court rejected a U.S. request for Bout’s extradition on the grounds that the FARC, a Colombian militia the U.S. has formally labeled a terrorist organization and whose dealings with Bout were the focus of a 2008 U.S. indictment against him, was not a terror group under Thai law.

As a sort of insurance against any ruling against the U.S. extradition request today, American authorities lodged two further charges of money laundering and electronic fraud against Mr Bout before today’s hearing – if their appeal had been rejected, he would have had to remain in jail pending another decision.

The court has recommended he be extradited within three months and now it is up to the Thai Government to decide whether they will follow through with the decision or ignore the advice of the court and release Bout.

For Thailand to do the latter would represent a massive diplomatic snub to the U.S., which has exerted significant pressure on Bangkok to have Bout either extradited. Russia has done the same, hoping to prevent the extradition and have Bout returned to Russia – where he reportedly enjoys close ties with the Kremlin.

Today’s judgment comes as the U.S. is adopting a more assertive stance in southeast Asia, cutting deals with countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia and Cambodia – ostensibly as a counter to China’s growing influence.

The Thai Ambassador in Washington, D.C. Was reportedly summoned to meet American officials earlier this week about the impending judgment, while Republican Ed Royce meanwhile penned a piece published in The Washington Post warning that the U.S.’s long-standing ties with Thailand could be damaged if Mr. Bout is freed, one of several American politicians to speak out on the Bout case in recent weeks. Then six members of Congress – three Democrats and three Republicans – sent a letter to the Thai Government on Wednesday saying that Bout’s release would enable him to resume selling arms to anti-American groups.

For its part, Moscow sold oil to Thailand at cut-price rate, and has discussed selling fighter jets to the Southeast Asian nation, which has become a popular destination for Russian tourists and the country’s post-Communist nouveau-riche.

Some have speculated that there may be a Burma connection to Bout’s arrest. According to analyst Zachary Abuja, writing at the time of Bout’s arrest, “my educated hunch is he was buying surplus Chinese weapons from the Burmese junta.” Bout is reported to have previously bought weaponry on the Thai-Cambodia border, and to have purchased end-user certificates in southeast Asia. The fake certificates allow arms buyers conceal their identity and facilitate purchase from dealers and weapons manufacturers by middle-men. The fact that the US DEA was involved in his arrest has fostered speculation that Bout was in the region for reasons related to the ‘Golden Triangle’ drugs trade, which also takes in Burma and some of the country’s ethnic militias who finance their operations through drug smuggling.

A former military translator, Bout was born in 1967, in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, then part of the USSR. He began his arms trading after the collapse of the Soviet Union, buying Russian military aircraft at bargain prices and using his connections to kick-start what became one of the world’s most notorious black-market arms trading schemes

According to Bout’s own website, he is “a dynamic, charismatic, spontaneous, well-dressed, well-spoken, and highly energetic person who can easily communicate in several languages including Russian, Portuguese, English, French, Arabic, among several others. He is a born salesman with undying love for aviation and eternal drive to succeed.”

According to author Moses Naim, in his Illicit – How Smugglers, Drug Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy, Bout “augmented his arms brokerage with conflict diamonds, frozen fish, cut flowers”, filling the holds of his aircraft with these materials for sale back in Europe and elsewhere, after the weaponry had been delivered to a particular conflict zone.

Bout’s sheer chutzpah extended, apparently, to flying missions for the U.S. in Iraq and for UN. As outlined in the book Merchant of Death, by Douglas Farah and Stephen Braun. Bout was hired to fly in arms to a particular group, the authors note, and then was paid by the UN to deliver humanitarian aid to the same area. It is not clear whether the U.N or U.S. Officials in either case understood that Bout was the man behind the front logistics and air transport companies hired for the tasks.

Bout is alleged to have simultaneously armed the Taliban and the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, as both sides fought each other in the years prior to the U.S.-led invasion in 2001. Bout is also reported to have armed Charles Taylor, the former warlord and President of Liberia, who in turn may have paid Bout in ‘conflict diamonds’ looted from nearby Sierra Leone. Taylor is now facing trial in The Hague for war crimes, with a high-profile witnesses including actress Mia Farrow and model Naomi Campbell testifying recently.

Bout’s trading empire drew both attention and grudging admiration, including in the 2005 film Lord of War,  starring Nicholas Cage – which is loosely-based on Bout’s career, but does scant justice to the complexity, range and audacity of Bout’s work. Ironically, Cage also featured in the movie Bangkok Dangerous, about a hitman hired by a Thai gangster. which, like Lord of War, was poorly-received by critics. If it was not already used, the title would appropriate for any Lord of War sequel. Bangkok has certainly proved dangerous for Victor Bout, in ways that Afghanistan, the DRC, Iraq, Liberia and Sudan never did.

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=120327

One-time enemies, the US and Vietnam are developing new-found links as both countries take stock of China’s rise.

Just over fifteen years after the US and Vietnam normalised relations marred by war, the naval destroyer USS John S. McCain docked in Da Nang last week to mark the anniversary. The ship is named after the grandfather of 2008 US presidential candidate John McCain, a former prisoner of war in Vietnam. Commanding officer Jeffrey Kim said that “over the last 15 years, we’ve established trust, a mutual respect, and I know that, in the coming years, our friendship and relationship will continue to become better.”

According to a Vietnamese scholar who requested anonymity, the tighter relations are seen as a good thing inside the country. “Vietnamese view the US rather positive as the war is becoming history in the memory of a new generation”, he said in an email.

Trading off civil liberties?

From a low base, US-Vietnam relations have grown during the decade-and-a-half since normalisation, with both Presidents Clinton and Bush II visiting Vietnam while in office. However, human rights activists have criticised what seems to be a bipartisan drive in Washington to develop ties with the one-party state. In 2006, on the eve of President Bush’s visit to Vietnam for an economic summit, the US State Department removed Vietnam from its short list of the world’s worst religious persecutors.

After Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in January 2007, the government arrested nearly 40 dissidents, sentencing more than 20 to lengthy prison terms. National Assembly elections were held in May of that year, but only 50 of the 500 deputies chosen did not belong to the Communist Party. Internet and media censorship remains tight, with a 2008 decree specifying the information that private bloggers may legally post on their blogs. Several political bloggers were harassed, temporarily detained, or jailed during 2009. A 2003 law bans the receipt and distribution of antigovernment e-mail messages, and, reminiscent of Thailand nowadays, websites considered “reactionary” are blocked.

Nonetheless, as Walter Lohman, Asia Studies Director at the Heritage Foundation put it “Since 2001 conclusion of the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Act really, economic relations with the U.S. have taken off.” The U.S. is Vietnam’s top export market and Americans are Vietnam’s top foreign investor, with bilateral trade reaching US$15.4 billion in 2009.

The McCain visit came after another by the USS George Washington – a massive Pacific-based aircraft carrier also utilised in recent US-South Korea naval exercises in the Yellow Sea, which irked both North Korea and China, which responded with highly-publicised military exercises of its own.

Countering China

The US is developing new links with southeast Asian countries as a counter to China’s growing influence – with statistics published on Monday August 16 suggesting that China may have overtaken Japan as the world’s second largest economy, albeit an assessment based only on quarterly data.

China is claiming ownership of the South China Sea, where it has territorial disputes with some southeast Asian countries, Vietnam included. At the July meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton American angered China by offering US support for “a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion.”

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi acknowledged that “there are territorial and maritime rights disputes” between China and some of its neighbors but, he said, “those disputes should not be viewed as ones between China and ASEAN as a whole just because the countries involved are ASEAN members.”

According to Dr Jian Junbo, Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University “the tactic of internationalizing South China Sea issue will be a bad thing for this region. China will never agree to internationalize this issue.”

Nuclear deal

The US and Vietnam are discussing a nuclear energy deal, which will build on a March agreement between the countries to expand cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy. Vietnam said in June it plans to build as many as 13 nuclear power plants with a capacity of 16000MW over the next twenty years.

Critics say the deal is contrary to the US counter-proliferation agenda – with China alleging double-standards. Other say that the the deal could lower the bar for nuclear technology transfer compared with US agreements with other countries, such as recent demand that the United Arab Emirates agree not to make nuclear fuel – a step on the road to developing nuclear weapons. Some say it is highly-unlikely that Vietnam would go rogue on nuclear technology, and that it lacks the technology to enrich uranium, for example. Carlyle Thayer is a Vietnam expert at the Australian Defense Force Academy in Canberra. He said that “Vietnam is a signatory to all the relevant conventions and would be open for intensive inspections to ensure that it was not diverting weapons grade material.”

Despite the growing US-Vietnam ties, Hanoi is not about to jettison China, the apparent model for its own doi moi governance system – economic liberalisation shackled down with continued one-party rule. has also moved to develop defence contacts with China. Vietnamese naval ships made their first port visit to China in 2010, after the two countries and China and Vietnam conducted their first joint search and rescue exercise. There is extensive cooperation over a swathe of areas – political, economic, social, cultural, defence – and through a variety of bilateral party to party, state-to-state, province to province and military to military channels, with hundreds of bilateral meetings each year.

However contentious issues such as the disputes over islands in the South China Sea, the massive bilateral trade balance and hundreds of thousands of illegal Chinese workers in Vietnam all perhaps stoke a feeling that China’s assertiveness needs countering. The two countries are thought be discussing a more formalised military relationship. According to Thayer , “Vietnam is signaling it want the US to remain engaged in the region as a hedge against Chinese military dominance.”

It is unlikely, however, that Vietnam will go too far to offend China in the process. To illustrate, in April 2009 the Vietnamese government temporarily suspended news magazine Du Lich for running articles about the country’s territorial dispute with China on the 30th anniversary of the Vietnamese-Chinese war. Dr Jian said that “Vietnam should keep friendly relations with China, although they have territorial disputes. Relying on US is not a good way to keep regional stability in South East Asia in a long run.”

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/LH14Ae01.html

BANGKOK – China’s dam building on the upper reaches of the Mekong river is raising hackles with downstream countries and providing the US with another strategic theater to counterbalance China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia.

The rising controversy comes alongside a range of new US initiatives in Southeast Asia, including recent US-led multilateral military training exercises in Cambodia, joint US-Vietnam naval training exercises, US-Vietnam discussions on sharing nuclear fuel and Washington’s announcement that it will re-engage with Kopassus, Indonesia’s controversial special forces unit.

The recent Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in Hanoi was overshadowed by Sino-American rivalry, with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton saying that the US was willing to mediate in territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Many Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam, believe Beijing increasingly views the contested maritime area as a Chinese lake.

China’s foreign minister Yang Jichi responded bluntly to Clinton’s remarks by saying that they amounted to “an attack on China”, before reminding Southeast Asian countries that China is a big country, implying that individually they are small. In response, countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines are being followed by Cambodia and Vietnam in trying to forge new links with the US as a counterbalance to China’s rapid rise.

That strategic hedge is increasingly evident on the Mekong. With four out of China’s eight planned dams already built on the Lancang – China’s name for the Mekong in its territory – and nine more either in place or awaiting construction on the river’s middle and lower reaches in Cambodia and Laos, its unclear how together these will impact on the region. Part of the problem is an uncoordinated approach, which not only means that country decisions are taken on a ‘national interest first’ basis, but also that distrust and enmity is heightened between river stakeholders.

According to Dr Richard Cronin, head of the Southeast Asia program at the Stimson Center in Washington DC, “fragmented decision-making and lack of coordination between stakeholders” means that all sides are going ahead with their own projects without getting to grips with how the separate dams ”impact on the river and region as a whole”. Cronin was speaking at a seminar organized by the American Studies Program at Bangkok’s Chulalongkorn University.

China controls the upper reaches of the river, where most of the hydro-electric potential is situated. Chulalongkorn University academic Ukrit Pathmanand said that “non-traditional” security problems could emerge from the building of more dams, with disgruntled people losing fishery income or farmland due to changes in the river potentially leading to social unrest. However, Ukrit added that there are positives and negatives to dam construction, with the benefits of additional hydropower to be weighed against the potential damage caused to the environment and livelihoods.

Political ebb and flow

The dam wrangle is becoming increasingly entwined with regional and global politics. A four-country intergovernmental body known as the Mekong River Commission (MRC) aims to better manage development along the waterway. The grouping, comprised of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam and established in 1995, held its first summit meeting in Hua Hin, Thailand, in April 2010. Notably, China and Myanmar have only accepted observer status in the MRC, despite being two of the six countries through which the river winds down to the South China Sea.

Pornlert Lattanan, President of General Electric (Thailand), said that it is unlikely that Cambodia and Laos will raise the Mekong issue with Beijing, which has close relations with both countries. This was seen at the MRC Summit, where Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen attributed the low waters in the Mekong region to climate change, rather than China’s withholding water behind its Mekong dams.

Thai premier Abhisit Vejjajiva was more circumspect, saying that “(t)his summit is sending a message that all countries in the Mekong Region, both its upper and lower parts, are stakeholders, and we all have to take joint responsibility for its long-term sustainability.” In June, Thai officials went further, with Prasarn Maruekpithak, a representative at a MRC meeting in Vietnam, saying that “China’s four dams on the upper part of the Mekong River have already destroyed the river’s ecosystem. Now this giant nation plans to build 12 dams more on the lower part.”

Vietnam is also concerned about the dams, including those planned for upstream areas in Cambodia and Laos. Le Duc Trung, director general of the Vietnam National Mekong Committee, is reported to have said on June 29 that “Vietnam has…great concerns over the research results on the projects (the proposed dams), especially impacts on agriculture and fisheries likely caused by their dams”.

The perceived threat to security and livelihoods is attracting interest from outside Southeast Asia. Japan held a meeting with the Mekong countries in Hanoi on the sidelines of the recent ASEAN Regional Forum to discuss a joint “Green Mekong” initiative for the next decade, which aims to tackle challenges such as natural disasters and deforestation. Japan’s Overseas Development Cooperation was listed as a sponsor of the Bangkok seminar on this subject, underscoring Japan’s interests in a region where it has substantial trade and investment links.

More pointedly, the US is also getting involved as part of its attempt to counter rising Chinese influence. US top diplomat Clinton recently met with the foreign ministers of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam in Hanoi as part of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), which was created in July 2009 as a means to enhance cooperation in the areas of environment, health, education, and infrastructure development.

According to Cronin, the Mekong could soon become Chinese-controlled with downstream countries dependent on sufficient water being released from dams in Yunnan and Guangxi provinces to keep the river flowing during the dry season. China has denied that its dams are to blame for low water levels on the river earlier this year, with its embassy in Bangkok issuing a statement on March 11 saying that claims to this effect are “baseless and incorrect”. Its an assessment partially corroborated by MRC chief executive officer Jeremy Bird, who said that low water levels on the river were likely due to the drought that hit Southeast Asia earlier this year. He, however, did not dismiss the possibility that China’s dams could be the cause.

Cronin acknowledges that recent US overtures are directly related to geopolitics, but said that it was initially difficult to get the Mekong issue onto the policymaking radar in Washington due to the multiplicity of issues facing Washington in Asia and elsewhere. The danger is that subsuming the complex environmental, political and socio-economic issues at stake on the Mekong into Sino-US great power rivalry may overshadow the practical steps and confidence-building measures needed to effectively address the river’s future.

Nonetheless, Cronin believes that overt US interest in the issue might at least prompt China into “listening more to concerns of other stakeholders”. That’s one interpretation of Beijing’s June decision to bring Southeast Asian officials on a rare tour of some of the dam sites inside southern China. However, it remains to be seen if China will go much further to allay concerns of downstream countries given the rising energy needs of its growing economy, and perhaps an emerging feeling in Beijing that the US and Southeast Asia are beginning to collaborate to contain its expanding interests.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=19110

As Thailand’s national petroleum and exploration company PTTEP inks a new deal to acquire gas from the M9 field off the coast of Burma, new US legislation may force disclosure from energy companies investing in the military-run country, including PTTEP.

Thailand’s Energy Minister Wannarat Channukul was in Burma yesterday for the signing of an agreement to purchase gas from M9, also known as Sawtika. He said that Thailand will rely on Burma more and more for energy needs as Thailand’s own petroleum reserves are run down over the coming 23 years.

However, on July 15, the US Congress passed what may prove to be landmark transparency legislation as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This will require oil, gas, and mining companies registered with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to publicly disclose their payments to governments for the extraction of natural resources on an annual basis.

The new law covers 90 percent of the major internationally operating and 12 of the top 15 Fortune-ranked oil and gas companies. According to Senators Ben Cardin (Democrat) and Richard Lugar (Republican), who mooted the inclusion of the provisions in the broader act, the tools are now available “to help people in resource-rich countries hold their leaders accountable for the money made from their oil, gas and minerals.”

It is not certain at present whether or not this will ultimately oblige PTTEP to disclose payments made to the Burmese junta. This will depend in part on the outcome of the rules under the law, which will be ironed out over the course of this year. The same applies to some of the other investors in Burma’s energy sector, such as Daewoo, Petrochina and CNPC.

However, Chevron will have to disclose under the terms of the law, and it is thought likely that Total will also, which could shed light on PTTEP payments to the Burmese government for the Yadana field, as all three companies are stakeholders in the Yadana gas project. PTTEP is also a stakeholder in the Yetagun field, buying gas from Premier Oil. China National Offshore Oil Corporation, which has significant investments in Burma, is also likely to be covered by the law.

Present law states that when companies fail to comply with SEC regulations in general, the US can delist the offender, an outcome which most businesses would likely find unpalatable.

Previously, EarthRights International (ERI) requested that PTTEP, along with Total and Chevron, disclose payments made to the Burmese military junta since the Yadana project came on stream. ERI says that all three companies responded to the request but without providing any detail on payments made. Matthew Smith of ERI told The Irrawaddy that the responses to date “do not address any of the fundamental concerns we have with regard to Yadana, on human rights or on transparency.”

Asked about payments to the Burmese regime, a PTTEP spokesperson told The Irrawaddy that the company “adheres to our codes of business conduct which encompass monetary transparency and is reflected in our participation to the disclosure of actual financial information to multi-stakeholders as guided by the applicable laws. We also strictly comply to the contractual obligations of the projects in the host countries where we operate.”

The Yadana project has generated more than US $9 billion since it came on stream in 2000. According to ERI, Burma’s ruling junta has pocketed more than $5 billion of this, the majority of which may have been squirreled away in Singaporean banks, transactions which the junta has sought to obfuscate by using an outdated and vastly undervalued exchange rate. According to a 2009 report by the International Monetary Fund, this revenue “contributed less than 1 percent of total budget revenue in 2007/08, but would have contributed about 57 percent if valued at the market exchange rate.”

The upshot is that the revenue does not appear in official statements about how much money the junta has at its disposal and is creating a false picture about the lack of social spending in Burma. A 2006 estimate of the child mortality rate in eastern Burma was 221 per 1,000, higher than the 205 recorded in the war-ravaged Democratic Republic of Congo. The World Health Organization ranks Burma’s health system as the second worst on the planet, while according to UNICEF more than 25 percent of the population lacks access to potable water.

According to Senators Carbin and Lugar, “If citizens and international organizations know how much money a country is paid for oil access, it is harder for its leader to claim the government would happily build roads, schools and hospitals but cannot afford them.”

Thailand’s growing energy needs are drawing it to other controversial projects inside Burma. Bangkok hopes to purchase additional hydroelectric power from two mooted dam projects on the Salween River inside Burma—the 1200 MW Hat Gyi dam and the 7000 MW Tasang dam.

The Salween projects and the M9 deal raise questions not only about corporate transparency and human rights issues, but also about apparent contradictions in Thailand’s broader policy toward Burma.

Tawin Pleansiri, the secretary-general of Thailand’s National Security Council (NSC), was quoted by the Thai News Service yesterday as saying that conditions for Burmese refugees to return home “would probably be after the general elections take place” sometime later this year.

However, Debbie Stothard of the NGO Altsean told The Irrawaddy that “overall, this is illogical, as giving the (Burmese) regime more funds means giving them the means to carry out more of the human rights abuses that have forced more displaced civilians to flee to Thailand.”

Thailand’s reliance on Burma as a source of energy could also, ironically, be exposing it to security threats from its western neighbor.

At the Asean Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi last week, Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya stated his concern about allegations that Burma was developing nuclear weapons and engaging in UN Security Council-defying weapons trading with North Korea. But in a documentary that aired on the Al Jazeera news network in June, defectors from Burma said that gas and oil revenues from Thailand have given the junta the financial resources necessary to increase military spending.

The income available to the ruling generals is set to increase dramatically in the coming years, not only with M9, but also with the vast Shwe gas field. The latter will generate an estimated $1 billion per year in revenue for the Burmese military government.

ERI and others have raised questions about human rights abuses carried out in the process of pipeline construction and maintenance in Burma. In response to these concerns, a PTTEP spokesperson told The Irrawaddy that the company “conducts business as a responsible corporate entity and we strongly support human rights where we operate,” adding that PTTEP is involved in healthcare and educational initiatives along the Yadana route.

Under fierce pressure from human rights groups, energy companies working on Yadana may well be working to improve living conditions for those living nearby, according to a Burma-based representative of an international organization, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=19039

Despite the US Senate vote to renew sanctions, America’s Burma policy seems to be floundering as Washington tries to address challenges throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

While US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton maintains rhetorical pressure on the military government in Burma, questions remain about the impact of and viability of American policy toward Burma.

Speaking in Hanoi, Clinton said that the US is “deeply concerned about the oppression taking place” inside the country, despite an election slated for sometime later this year. Since highly restrictive election laws were announced earlier this year, the US has repeatedly stated that the vote is unlikely to be free and fair.

The promulgation of the election laws came after the US said it was adopting a more open-minded approach to dealing with the Burmese junta, pledging to review existing sanctions if some reform measures were taken by the Burmese rulers.

In a reminder of US criteria, Clinton said today, “We urge Burma to put in place the necessary conditions for credible elections, including releasing all political prisoners, respecting basic human rights and ceasing attacks against ethnic minorities.” The US has consistently shied away from calling for the controversial 2008 Constitution to be revised.

The election laws were taken as a slap in the face by the US administration, which looks set to maintain economic sanctions on the regime and its associates. The US Congress on Thursday renewed a ban on imports from the country for another year, with the Senate voting almost unanimously to extend the sanctions. The bill now goes to President Barack Obama to sign it. The law bans trade with and freezes assets belonging to companies tied to the junta.

The EU and Australia also apply sanctions against the Burmese rulers and associated businesses, but key trade and diplomatic partners in Asia do not, leaving many to argue that the sanctions have little influence on the Burmese rulers, though the efforts made by junta business ally Tay Za’s family to have EU sanctions against one of his son’s lifted, suggests that elites inside Burma do feel the pinch somewhat.

When the US announced that it was extending a hand to the Burmese rulers, some Asean states spun this as recognition that their softly-softly political engagement of the regime, coupled with lucrative and burgeoning trade and investment links, was a better means to try to influence the junta. The US denied that this was implied in its policy shift, which it said was not really a shift at all, maintaining that sanctions remained necessary.

However, the US did not spell out clearly and decisively what it meant by its proposed engagement, allowing self-styled pragmatists to state their case more decisively and imply that proponents of sanctions are naive, moralistic ideologues propounding an untenable policy.

It might be more pragmatic, however, to see that there is scant pragmatism in bankrolling Burma’s oppressive status quo, if there is also a hope that democratization and reform will come to Burma in return, as Singapore, Thailand, et al, reiterate. Those that oppose sanctions have no apparent strategy designed to influence or achieve such an outcome. The status quo benefits all sides concerned, in the pocket, and in the short term.

The bottom line is, of course, if countries with real economic influence over Burma—such as China, India, Thailand, Singapore, South Korea—put more pressure on the regime, then sanctions might then be a viable means to such an end. The mantra of “non-interference” is usually trotted out to justify a lax approach, but of course the reality is that by providing the Burmese generals with billions of dollars in revenue and diplomatic cover, this non-interference is de facto propping up a military government that has lasted since 1962.

As for the Americans, they have never sold the need for sanctions to the Burmese junta’s partners.

If more widely applied targeted sanctions could make a difference, as the Americans imply, but never say too forcefully or cogently, then why not spell this out to Burma’s allies and neighbors?

The Obama administration has been at pains to put daylight between it and its predecessor, with much lip-service being paid to “smart” policy and “realist” foreign policy thinking, and an almost-ideological zeal to appear as non-ideological as possible. There seems to be a sort of sacramental thinking applied here—that by using such adjectives, the so-called smart and realistic policy therefore is automatically rendered smart and realistic in the real world. It is a delusion akin to an author who thinks that by writing about a chair, he or she has thereby transformed literature into furniture.

However, the US has not said clearly how either sanctions or engagement or a mixture can influence change in Burma, or what it would like to see by way of partnership from Burma’s democratic neighbors, who pay lip service to their hope for change in Burma.

The US might be smarter and more realistic to remind Burma’s neighbors that it is in their long-term interest to see a stable, free Burma. After all, it seems that the US outreach to Burma is also based on realism—and national self-interest—as part of Washington’s strategy to cope with the rise of China in the Asia-Pacific region.

Surely Thailand—a US treaty ally—could be persuaded to see that if the junta was forced to adopt real reforms, it could benefit the impoverished Burmans and ethnic minorities which have fled across the border to Thailand, and facilitate a return home for Thailand’s massive Burmese immigrant community? Moreover, the opaque nature of rule in Burma means that nobody really knows what the regime is thinking or doing, with consequences for regional security as seen in ongoing defector revelations about military and nuclear cooperation with North Korea.

Surely the US could state this clearly to India, the world’s largest democracy, in advance of Than Shwe’s July 25 visit to the country, as surely India does not want a North Korea-backed nuclear state on its borders? India itself is a nuclear power, but as a democracy it has civilian control over the military. The US could remind India that a nuclear-armed military dictatorship next door is hardly worth a few extra oil and gas concessions, given that the US sees itself as a smart exponent of foreign policy realism.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LF29Ak02.html

T-shirt for sale in Jerusalem. (Photo: Simon Roughneen)

JERUSALEM – In ‘The Great Divorce’ C.S. Lewis attempted to allegorise about a reality which he admitted he could not know, but tentatively hoped to suggest. The US-Israeli relationship, to most, seems like an unbreakable bond, and any potential divorce might be regarded as unimaginable.

But when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meets US President Barack Obama on July 6, they will discuss a relationship that is on the rocks, despite an annual US$2billion in aid and – in keeping with the traditional parameters of the relationship – Obama’s repeated commitment to Israel’s security. Stirring things up in advance, Israel’s Ambassador to the US Michael Oren spent Sunday and Monday denying media reports that he told Israeli diplomats that a “tectonic rift” was emerging between the two countries.

The summit will be a reprise of a stillborn meeting originally scheduled for late May, which Netanyahu cancelled after nine Turks were killed by Israeli commandoes onboard one of the six boats attempting to breach the blockade on the Hamas-run Gaza Strip. In the aftermath, whatever Obama’s private thoughts, he refused to join the chorus condemning Israel. But American policymakers felt themselves to be caught between a rock and a hard place, and beyond this incident, there are divergent worldviews colouring thinking in both administrations.

Much has been made of Obama’s attempts to “reach out” to the Muslim world, and his sackcloth-and-ashes pose for perceived American foreign policy sins-of-the-fathers. But In Israel his Cairo Speech was taken as a signal that this American administration does not see Middle East geopolitics in the same light as its ally, and therefore puts Israel in danger.

It is not the first time that the two have quarreled, with tetchy relations apparent during the Bush I administration. Alon Pinkas is former Israeli Consul-General to the US. Speaking to seminar of foreign and Israeli journalists at the IDC Herzliya last week, he believes that a turning point has been reached in bilateral relations. “In reality, US interests in the Middle East are with the Arab world. That is where the oil is, and Israel is just one small country surrounded by 290 million Arabs”, he said.

That is just part of the bigger picture. Both Obama and Afghanistan-bound Gen. David Petraeus believe that “solving” the Israel-Palestine conflict will contribute to US strategy elsewhere – particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, an unproven and hazy thesis that fits in well with Obama’s hoped-for outreach to the Muslim world.

Again, this is being noted by Israelis. Dr Jonathan Fine teaches at the IDC Herzliya. Reminding AToL that the US that Israel is dealing with much the same ideological opponents in Hamas as the jihadists the US faces in Afghanistan or Iraq, he lamented that “the Obama effect” means that the US does not receive anywhere near the same condemnation as when Israel attacks its nearby enemies, or engages in a clumsy and deadly attempt to stop boats reaching Gaza. America’s targeted assassinations and drone warfare continue in south Asia, in greater number and to deadlier effect than during the Bush II era.

Israel feels it has been sacrificed on the altar of another Obama initiative, which might otherwise be described as inherently laudable. At the recent Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, Obama endorsed a resolution which omitted any mention of Iran but specifically targeted Israel, demanding that it sign the NPT and allow inspections of its facilities. Whatever about the rights and wrongs of the specifics, the disparity between including Israel and excluding Iran was glaring to Israeli policymakers.

Netanyahu has already signaled his willingness to concede in the face of international pressure by the recent announcement to ease the Gaza blockade, which the US regards as untenable. In doing so, he may have left himself vulnerable domestically, with the so-called ‘centrist’ Kadima Party led by Tzipi Livni leading the charge. She is seen by many in Washington as less-hardline than the current coalition, with whispers that the US might work behind the scenes to unseat Netanyahu who seen as beholden to religious parties in his coalition and therefore unable to meet the US halfway on issues such as settlement expansion.

After the announcement that the Gaza blockade would be relaxed, Livni accused the Netanyahu Government of making policy at the dictates of international opinion. Previously she accused the incumbent of destroying Israel’s position in world opinion, by its reaction to the flotilla. So before Netanyahu goes to the White House, it seems that Livni has her sights trained on him, irrespective of whether he aligns more closely to Obama on settlements, Gaza or Iran, or whether another row ensues. It is just a few weeks since Vice-President Joe Biden was humiliated in Jerusalem by the announcement that Israel plans 1600 new houses in East Jerusalem. In contrast with the visiting Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, Netanyahu did not get the customary White House Lawn press and photo-op with the US President during his most recent visit to the US.

He is likely to this time, though cynics might feel this is more about Obama playing to domestic politics than a reappraisal of how the US administration views Israel. Well-known foreign policy analyst Anthony Cordesman recently rationalised that Netanyahu’s government is becoming a “strategic liability” for the US, saying that “It is time Israel realised that it has obligations to the US, as well as the US to Israel, and that it becomes far more careful about the extent to which it tests the limits of US patience and exploits the support of American Jews.”

That support will weigh on Obama’s mind as he continues his introduction to what predecessor Harry S Truman described as a problem unmatched in its complexity and potential for controversy. While 78% of American Jews voted for Obama in 2008, it seems many might be having second thoughts. With midterm elections looming and the passage of the healthcare bill tempered by spectacular losses such as Republican Scott Brown’s victory in Massachusetts, Obama may not want to see the relationship with Israel deteriorate on his watch, for now at least.

Old-school powerhouses in the American-Jewish lobby have rowed in behind the Israeli Government and lambasted the Obama administration’s cool approach to the “special relationship” between the two countries, though there are divergent views within the constituency. Stephen M Walt co-authored ‘The Israel Lobby and US foreign policy’, a provocative take on the influence of the Jewish lobby in the US. He told AtoL that “here are some new pro-Israel groups like J Street that are trying to encourage smarter policies, and there is a much more open discussion of these issues now (due in part to the rise of the Internet and the blogosphere), but the raw political power of AIPAC et al is still formidable.” An April survey by Quinnipiac University showed 67 percent of Jews as disapproving of Barack Obama’s “handling [of] the situation between Israel and the Palestinians.” In another poll, support for President Obama in the Jewish community dropped to 58 percent, a loss of 20 points on the 2008 election.

However other data suggests that the majority of American Jewish voters are card-carrying Democrats and liberal progressives first, with Israel policy less of a priority. This makes them somewhat of an anomaly in a party whose supporters are far less likely to be supportive of Israel than Republicans. (48 percent among Democrats, 85 percent among Republicans).

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18095

An official at the US embassy in Bangkok has said that Burma’s recently announced election law must be amended, otherwise the scheduled 2010 polls will be “very difficult to judge as free, fair or credible.”

Addressing a forum on Burma at Chulalongkorn University on Monday, George Kent, who is Political Counsel at the US embassy in Thailand, compared the military junta’s handpicked Electoral Commission––which has veto powers over candidates––to a similar system used by the rulers of Iran. He said that although the US is “trying to take advantage of any potential openings presented by the election period,” the electoral laws and bylaws indicate that “the government does not have the intention to respond.”

He reiterated calls for the release of all political prisoners and the holding of an inclusive dialogue process in Burma before the election is held.

Kent added that the US is “closely considering” the recent report and recommendations made by UN Special Rapporteur Tomás Ojea Quintana, including the suggestion that the UN Security Council discuss the possible establishment of a Commission of Inquiry into war crimes and crimes against humanity in Burma.

Earlier an array of activists, journalists, academics and civil society groups discussed the proposed election, with divisions emerging over whether the polls represented a real opportunity for change in Burma.

The main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), is due to announce on March 29 whether or not it will participate in the election, with political prisoners including its leader Aung San Suu Kyi barred from running. The NLD will have to expel Suu Kyi if it wants to participate, according to the election law.

Dr. Nay Win Maung, the co-founder of Rangoon-based NGO EGRESS, said, “Those of us inside the country do not have the luxury of opposing the election,” which he said he believes will lead to a form of “liberal authoritarianism,” which, though imperfect, will be better than the status quo, he said.

“If we do not go through with the election,” he said, “we are choosing to push continued military rule.”

The counter-argument is that by taking part in the elections, the opposition would lend credibility to a flawed election process, designed to maintain military rule. The best-case scenario is “a civilianization of government, rather than a civilian government”, according to Larry Jagan, Burma expert and former BBC Correspondent.

Dr. Maung Zarni, now a visiting fellow at Chulalongkorn University, paid tribute to the dissidents and more than 2,100 political prisoners inside Burma. Dr. Zarni said he believes that many of the political prisoners could secure their release by swearing their loyalty to the regime and co-operating with its self-described “Roadmap to Democracy.”

“But they decide to stay in jail, for what they believe in,” he said.

Burmese activists in exile have asked that the international community to refuse to recognize the upcoming election, and groups such as the Karen National Union (KNU) have already declared that they will not participate.

Thein Oo was elected as MP for the NLD in the 1990 election, which the military overturned after a resounding NLD victory. Speaking last week at the launch of a petition to oppose the election, he said that “parties cannot campaign or participate when the law obliges them to kick out their leadership or many of their key members in advance.”

Advocating optimism, Aung Naing Oo of the Vahu Development Institute said that people need to “think outside the ballot box.” Ethnic minorities will have some devolved powers, he said, and should avail of this new opportunity to acquire a greater say in how Burma is run.

“There are some good generals, from the various ethnic groups, who may decide to run for parliament,” he said. “We should be trying to support those people.”

However the decades-old, on-off fighting between the Burmese-dominated military and the ethnic groups will not be resolved by this election, according to The Irrawaddy editor Aung Zaw, who said that without any reconciliation there will not be any positive political change in Burma.

The Burmese army is reported to be sending reinforcements to ethnic minority strongholds after ethnic militias defied four deadlines to stand down and become part of the state border guard forces.

Director of the Brussels-based Euro-Burma Office, Harn Yawnghwe comes from the Shan region of Burma. He recalled that military concerns about possible separatism among ethnic groups motivated the 1962 coup, when the military took power in Burma. “The may offer some concessions,” he said, “but will not negotiate on key issues that the ethnic representatives want.”

Other potential chinks of light, according to some observers, include the recent spate of privatizations undertaken by the junta. Dr. Nay Win Maung believes that by changing the relationship between the state and market, the regime is facilitating what could be a different engagement between government and civil society.

However, Canadian Ambassador to Thailand Ron Hoffman said that his government was concerned at the “moribund services and lack of transparency” in the privatization process, which Dr. Zarni compared with the firesale of Russia’s economy after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when state assets and resources went for a relative pittance to former regime insiders turned entrepreneurs.

Taken in the context of the massive expansion of revenues from oil and gas in recent years, privatization will do little more than “expand and deepen the regime’s economic comfort zone,” he concluded.

Copyright © 2008 Irrawaddy Publishing Group | www.irrawaddy.org

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18077

Sounding resolute and appearing in good spirits, Kyaw Zaw Lwin walked through Bangkok’s Suvarnabhumi Airport yesterday a free man, after spending 6 months in detention in Burma.

Nyi Nyi Aung speaks to reporters at Bangkok's international airport on Thursday evening (The Irrawaddy).

Also known as Nyi Nyi Aung, he spoke briefly to journalists at the airport, saying “I am really happy to be free, but it is not a deep happiness. I have family and friends who are still in jail in Burma.”

Nyi Nyi Aung was jailed on February 10 last, on charges of carrying a fake identification card and undeclared foreign currency and for failing to give up his Burmese citizenship. The regime bars citizens from holding a foreign passport or multiple citizenship. He was arrested in September 2009 at the international airport in Rangoon, accused of attempting to foment political unrest in Burma, and was tortured while in detention. He says he visited Burma to see his mother, San San Tin, who is in prison. She was jailed for her participation in the 2007 Saffron Revolution, and is ill with thyroid cancer.

According to a press release issued by Freedom Now, which provided pro bono legal assistance to Nyi Nyi Aung. prominent US lawmakers were closely-involved in the campaign for his release. These included Senators Barbara Mikulski, Richard Durbin, John Kerry, Richard Lugar, Mitch McConnell, John McCain, and Benjamin Cardin, and Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Jim McGovern, and Frank Wolf, among others. Archbishop Desmond Tutu and former Czech President Vaclav Havel are Honorary Co-Chairs of Freedom Now, and both men have been prominent advocates for the release of political prisoners in Burma.

Nyi Nyi Aung is an American citizen, and is travelling back to the US today (Friday). He has a degree in computer science from Purdue University and worked for the U.S Government, at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. His fiancee, Wa Wa Kyaw, works as a nurse in Maryland. Her impassioned yet cogently-argued plea for the US to do more to secure Nyi Nyi’s release was published last month in the Wall Street Journal. She concluded – “President Obama and Secretary Clinton, my message is simple. Neither your words nor your actions show that you take my fiancé’s imprisonment seriously. I beg you to stop ignoring his plight, and to help secure his release from this illegal and unjust imprisonment.”

In 2009, US citizen John Yettaw was imprisoned after swimming across a Rangoon lake to Aung San Suu Kyi’s home. Mr Yettaw was later released, after US Democrat Senator Jim Webb visited Burma and met with Sen. Gen, Than Shwe, a privilege denied to UN Secreatry-General Ban ki Moon when he visited Burma just weeks before. Freedom Now confirmed that it did not work with Sen. Webb’s office in seeking Nyi Nyi Aung’s release.

Commenting yesterday on his freedom, Nyi Nyi Aung said that “ I did not expect to be out so soon.” His lawyer, Beth Schwanke, told The Irrawaddy by email that “We’re thrilled that Nyi Nyi has been released. However, it is important to not let his release distract from the larger picture. There are at least 2,100 other political prisoners in Burma.”

On December 17, 2009, a bipartisan group of 53 Members of the US Congress sent a letter to junta leader Sen Gen Than Shwe seeking Nyi Nyi Aung’s release. However despite this request, he was subsequently sentenced to three years imprisonment with hard labour, on February 10 2010, before being freed yesterday.

The New Light of Myanmar newspaper, a mouthpiece for the junta, said the government pardoned and deported Nyi Nyi Aung after giving “special consideration to bilateral friendship in accordance with the request made by the U.S. State Department” to free him.

Beth Schwanke told The Irrawaddy that “it is clear that within the last week the junta has been under considerable international pressure because of its release of new, illegitimate election laws and the call for a Commission of Inquiry at the Human Rights Council.”

The Burmese junta has a history of tactical prisoner release, timed to distract attention from ongoing rights abuses, or to deflect international condemnation for undemocratic policies. In February, National League for Democracy (NLD) Vice-Chairman Tin Oo was released from house arrest, just days before UN human rights envoy Tomas Ojea Quintana made his third visit to the country – a five day series of visits to various prisons, among other locations, which later contributed to the envoy’s analysis that an international commission of inquiry should be established, to investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity in Burma.

Aung Din is Executive Director of the US Campaign for Burma. Welcoming the news of yesterday’s release, he told The Irrawaddy that “he should not be arrested from the beginning”, adding that “we demand the release of all political prisoners in Burma, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.” The Obama administration on Thursday welcomed the release of Kyaw Zaw Lwin. State Department Acting spokesman Gordon Duguid said at a news conference, “The United States has been working intensely with Burmese officials for some time to attain his release, and we welcome it. We assisted Mr. Lwin as appropriate and have informed his family of his departure from Burma.”

Nyi Nyi Aung thanked the Burmese and international campaign groups which lobbied for his release and publicised his cause throughout his detention. When asked about the political situation in Burma, he said that “I have just been released, so am not up to date with all the information”. However he pledged that he will work for democracy in Burma as best he could, from outside the country. Nyi Nyi Aung is among the ’8888 Generation’, a group comprised mainly of university students who took part in pro-democracy protests in August 1988. Those demonstrations were crushed by the ruling junta, with an estimated 3000 lives lost, Many of the 8888 Generation now live in exile, like Nyi Nyi Aung, but others remain incarcerated inside Burma.

Since the 2007 Saffron Revolution, over 1,100 political activists have been arrested and remain in detention. During 2009, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners in Burma, 264 political prisoners were arrested, 129 activists were sentenced, 266 were released, and 71 prisoners were transferred. Year on year, the number of political prisoners in Burma has gone up. As of 31 December 2009 there were a total of 2,177 political prisoners in Burma, an overall increase of 15 in comparison with the previous year’s total, according to the AAPP.

The true figure may be even higher, however, Speaking last month at the launch of the Amnesty International report “The Repression of Ethnic Minority Activists in Myanmar”, Benjamin Zawacki estimated that the real number of political prisoners detained in Burma could be as high as 2,500 or more. 208 ethnic minority political prisoners are currently detained in Burma’s array of jails, according to the AAPP. However AI believes that due to the dearth of accurate information coming out of Burma as well the difficulties faced in accessing prisons, detention centers and ethnic minority areas, the real numbers are almost certainly in excess of what is already known.

In a rueful and ironic aside, Nyi Nyi told The Irrawaddy that “in Burma, the jail is the only place where people can speak freely to each other. Outside it is much more difficult, unless you want to end up inside the prison.”

Lalit K. Jha in Washington contributed to this story.